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CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE WTO: 
PROSPECTS FOR COMPLIANCE 
DONALD C. CLARKE∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well understood both inside and outside of China that the task of 
making China’s laws and regulations conform to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) requirements is a huge one. But a key feature of 
China’s accession to the WTO that sets it apart from most other countries 
is not the size of the task, but the fact that accession is part of a larger 
strategy of massive and fundamental economic reform. 
China’s economic reform era is now over twenty years old. The scope 
of the planned economy has been steadily shrinking, and few state-owned 
enterprises can afford to ignore market principles. Tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers had been steadily dropping prior to WTO entry, while rules 
on foreign investment were gradually liberalized. The Chinese government 
has embarked on this strategy for its own sake, not to fulfill treaty 
commitments to foreigners, and Chinese leaders have sought WTO 
membership not simply because they believe that it will open more 
markets to Chinese products, but because they see membership as giving 
them extra leverage to force through difficult changes in the domestic 
economic system. Many in the leadership understand that China’s WTO 
commitments, while labeled “concessions” in the language of international 
trade negotiations, are not really “concessions” to be reluctantly yielded at 
all, but rather sound policies that China would be wise to adopt even 
without WTO membership.1 Reforms simply imposed from outside are 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. I wish to thank the Asian 
Law Forum of Yale Law School for providing the initial stimulus to put together some thoughts on the 
subject of this article, and the China Law Center at Yale Law School for providing the environment in 
which to do it. These themes were further developed in testimony before the U.S.-China Security 
Review Commission in January, 2002 and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China in June, 
2002, as well as at a panel at the March, 2002 annual meeting of the American Society of International 
Law. 
 I am privileged to be able to publish this final version in a collection honoring Bill Jones, one of 
the founders of Chinese law studies in this country, and an exemplar—with his erudition, wit, and 
uncommonly gracious manner—of the kind of scholar we should all aspire to be. I am proud to count 
myself a friend and colleague. 
 1. See, for example, the remarks of Kong Xiangjun, a judge in the administrative tribunal of the 
Supreme People’s Court: 
[W]e should not . . . conclude that [China’s commitments regarding judicial review] are some 











unlikely to go beyond surface compliance—if they get even that far—and 
truly take root. But many of the reforms required by China’s WTO 
accession, from market opening to greater transparency in administrative 
procedures, have a strong domestic constituency as well as a foreign one. 
In November of 2001, for example, the influential Fazhi Ribao [Legal 
System Daily], published no fewer than three commentaries by prominent 
law professors welcoming the pressures that WTO membership would 
impose in the direction of limited government and increased transparency.2 
Thus, although China’s trading partners may encounter rules and practices 
inconsistent with China’s WTO commitments and delays in curing these 
inconsistencies, it is not necessarily due to bad faith and foot-dragging by 
the central government (although of course that is a possibility). In many 
cases it will be due simply to the normal and well-documented difficulty 
the central government faces in getting many things done. 
This is by no means a counsel of inaction and infinite patience on the 
part of China’s trading partners in the face of a failure by China to live up 
to its commitments in certain areas. As I have noted, part of the whole 
point of China’s joining the WTO—a central government decision 
essentially imposed on local governments—was to add foreign pressure to 
existing domestic pressures for reform. It does nobody any favors to 
pretend that specific and binding obligations do not exist. But it is 
necessary to bear in mind that not all violations will be deliberate, and that 
not all delay is obstruction. 
 
 
kind of price or sacrifice that had to be made for China to enter the WTO. This kind of 
provision reflects the serious attitude and commitment of China to promoting the 
advancement of the rule of law . . . . It is completely in accord with China’s strategy of 
governing the country according to law and will advance China’s progress in establishing the 
rule of law. The beneficiary in the end will be China. 
Kong Xiangjun, Jianli yu WTO Yaoqiu Xiang Shiying de Sifa Shencha Zhidu [Establish a System of 
Judicial Review that Meets the Requirements of the WTO], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE 
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 6, at 3, 8 (2001). 
 2. See Yuan Chengben, Ru Shi Wei Sifa Gaige Tian Dongli [Joining the WTO Pushes Forward 
Judicial Reform], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Internet edition, Nov. 30, 2001 (interviewing 
Professor Li Shuguang); Ma Huaide, WTO Yu Zhengfu Zhizheng Linian [The WTO and the Guiding 
Concept of Government], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Nov. 26, 2001, at 5; Wang Feng, “Ru 
Shi” Yaoqiu Zhengfu Juese Zhuanhuan [Entry into the WTO Requires a Change in the Role of 
Government], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Nov. 12, 2001, at 1; see also Nan Xianghong, 
WTO: Fa de Chongxin Goujia [WTO: The Restructuring of Law], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Internet edition, Oct. 25, 2001; Guo Guosong, Wei Sifa Gongzheng Jianli Zhidu 
Bingzhang [Establish Institutional Protections For Judicial Justice], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Internet edition, Oct. 25, 2001 (addressing the need for better court procedures, from 
improving the quality of judges to achieving greater transparency). For Chinese language sources, I 
have placed the author’s surname before the given name in accordance with Chinese usage. 











DOMESTIC APPLICABILITY WITHIN CHINA OF WTO NORMS 
One issue that has been the subject of some debate both inside and 
outside of China is that of the effect within the Chinese legal system of 
China’s WTO obligations. In my view, as a practical matter, China’s 
WTO obligations will not become part of its domestic law, binding on 
courts and government bodies, until the enactment of appropriate domestic 
legislation and regulations incorporating those obligations. To hold 
otherwise would be to believe that Chinese courts would act contrary to 
existing domestic regulations on the basis of nothing more than a treaty 
text. Although as a legal matter the issue is less clear, I believe that on 
balance the better legal conclusion conforms to the practical one. 
China became a WTO member through its internal procedures for the 
signing and ratification of treaties.3 There are three ways in which China’s 
treaty obligations might become part of its domestic law. First, they can be 
embodied in domestic legislation—a term I use here to include all 
authoritative sources of state norms in China, including “interpretations” 
and other documents issued by the Supreme People’s Court and other 
bodies. China has adopted this approach, known as “transformation,” on 
many occasions.4 Second, they can be incorporated through specific 
reference in domestic legislation. This approach, which I shall call 
“mediated incorporation,” can be found in Article 142 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law and Article 238 of the Law on Civil Procedure. 
Each law directs courts, in cases involving foreigners, to apply the 
provisions of international treaties to which China is a signatory when 
such provisions conflict with relevant provisions of the law in question. 
This approach can also be found in directives issued to lower courts by the 
Supreme People’s Court. In 1987, for example, the court issued a notice to 
 
 
 3. Professor Bing Ling of the City University of Hong Kong makes a persuasive argument that 
the ratification procedure was defective in that the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
granted a before-the-fact authorization (on August 25, 2000, long before the accession protocol had 
taken its final form and been signed by the Chinese government’s representative), not an after-the-fact 
ratification. See Bing Ling, Is China’s Accession to the WTO Legally Valid? (2002), at 
http://personal.cityu.edu.hk/lwbing/Research/WTO.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). As Professor Ling 
points out, however, the validity of China’s accession, in spite of any procedural defects, seems 
unquestionable as a matter of international law under Articles 45 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. See id.; see also James Kynge, Academics Hit at Procedure to Join WTO, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at 14. I would argue further that as a practical matter it is unquestionable—or at 
least, will not be questioned—as a matter of Chinese domestic law as well. 
 4. In 1986, for example, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, thereby 
tranforming into domestic law China’s obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 











lower courts instructing them to give priority to the provisions of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in cases where the Convention applied and domestic law 
contained contrary provisions.5 While the mediated incorporation 
approach requires Chinese courts and government bodies ultimately to 
look directly to treaty texts instead of the texts of domestic law, it is 
domestic law that tells them to do so. 
While the above two methods of making treaty obligations part of 
domestic law are not controversial, real debate revolves around the issue 
of whether bare treaty obligations, without more, can or should be 
considered a source of binding norms by legal decisionmakers. While 
academic views on this question are divided, the views of government 
officials are generally in the negative: specific transformation or mediated 
incorporation is necessary. This was certainly the view China presented in 
the meetings of the WTO Working Party, where China undertook to meet 
its WTO commitments “through revising its existing laws and enacting 
new ones fully in compliance with the WTO Agreement.”6 
Whether treaty obligations can become part of domestic law without 
further mediation (a theory I shall call “unmediated incorporation”) is a 
subject for debate because both the Chinese constitution and China’s 
legislation are silent on the issue. Indeed, China’s first post-1949 textbook 
on international law, the chief editor of which was the eminent scholar 
Wang Tieya, ably canvasses various approaches, but takes no position on 
which one applies in China.7 
The official view has long been that China had a system in which its 
international law obligations automatically became part of domestic law. 
This view was formed, however, in an era when China’s international law 
obligations were all state obligations, and private rights were not 
implicated. Thus, China had essentially no international law obligations 
 
 
 5. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing Woguo Jiaru de “Chengren Ji Zhixing Waiguo 
Zhongcai Caijue Gongyue” de Tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Implementation 
of the “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” of Which China 
Is a Member], art. 1  (Apr. 10, 1987). 
 6. World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Nov. 10, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm [hereinafter Working Party Report], ¶ 67. 
 7. See GUOJI FA [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 42-47, 346-48 (Wang Tieya ed., 1981); see also GUOJI 
FA [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 37-42 (Liu Haishan ed., 1992); GUOJI GONGFA [INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
LAW] 37-41 (Liang Shuying ed., 1993). Liang Shuying’s work seems to hold that domestic law takes 
priority over international obligations in case of conflict, as it expresses the need for governments to 
strive to ensure that their domestic legislation is consistent with such obligations. See GUOJI GONGFA, 
supra, at 39. If international obligations took priority, consistency would not matter. 











about which court enforcement in private litigation might be an issue. Its 
obligations were obligations of the government to do or not to do things 
with respect to other governments and their officials. Hence, it was 
possible to hold that there was and could be no conflict between 
international law and China’s domestic law, because the government 
would always do what international law required of it. 
Once one begins talking about the recognition of private rights, 
however, the argument becomes more difficult to support. Wang Tieya 
and others support their argument by noting the existence of some statutes 
providing that where the provisions of the statute conflict with China’s 
international treaty obligations, China’s international treaty obligations 
shall override the provisions of the statute.8 But surely this shows precisely 
that a specific rule in a domestic statute is necessary to give domestic legal 
effect to a treaty obligation. The very fact that the rule needs to be stated in 
a domestic statute or other official norm contradicts their position. 
The key proof of the theory of unmediated incorporation would be a 
case where a court, in the absence of an authoritative instruction to refer to 
treaty provisions, nevertheless applied such provisions even though the 
rules of domestic law dictated a different result. I know of no such case. A 
recent article by Qingjiang Kong cites two cases9 that the author believes 
demonstrate the direct and unmediated application of treaty provisions by 
Chinese courts.10 In both cases, Chinese courts purported to apply the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules). A reading of the cases reveals 
that they did so, however, because the parties had agreed contractually to 
apply the Hague Rules to their disputes. Indeed, China is not even a 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text. This argument is made in Tieya 
Wang, The Status of Treaties in the Chinese Legal System, 1 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1 (1995) and 
Meng Xianggang, Woguo Shiyong WTO Guoji Guize de Liang Wenti [Two Issues in the Application in 
China of the International Rules of the WTO], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS], 
Internet edition, Mar. 29, 2001. It appears in many other sources as well. The strongest argument I 
have seen from a court or government official appears in Sun Nanshen, Cong Zhongguo Ru Shi Kan 
WTO Xieyi Zai Zhongguo Fayuan de Shiyong [Viewing the Application of the WTO Agreements in 
Chinese Courts from China’s Accession to the WTO], FALÜ SHIYONG [APPLICATION OF LAW], no. 9, 
at 2 (2000) (the author is a vice president of the Jiangsu Province Higher Level People’s Court, only 
one level below the Supreme People’s Court). In addition to the argument from incorporation favored 
by Wang Tieya, Sun argues (as do others) that the similarity in procedure for national legislation and 
treaty ratification means that they should have equal legal validity. See id. 
 9. China Material Supply Corp. of Xiamen Special Econ. Zone of Fujian Province v. Europe-
Overseas Steamship Lines NV Belg., 3 CHINA LAW REPORTS 740 (P. Leung ed., 1995) (Maritime 
Court of Shanghai City, Dec. 9, 1991); Japan (Taisho) Sea Fire Ins. Co. v. Tianjin Branch of China 
Gen. Foreign Trade Trans. Co., id. at 745 (Maritime Court of Tianjin City, Nov. 22, 1991). 
 10. See Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of WTO Agreements in China: Illusion or Reality?, 35 J. 
WORLD TRADE 1208 (2001). 











signatory to the Hague Rules, and thus there was no treaty obligation in 
the first place. 
Whatever academic views might be,11 the views that count, from the 
standpoint of China’s trading partners and those doing business in China, 
are those of government officials, and in particular court officials. As 
noted above, I believe the statement of China’s representative to the WTO 
Working Party constitutes a denial of the doctrine of unmediated 
incorporation. Equally important, however, are statements from senior 
officials of the Supreme People’s Court (which has authority over the 
court system) and academics published in official or semi-official sources. 
Professor Jiang Guoqing, for example, states in a lecture posted on a 
website administered by the Office of the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee that treaty norms do not apply in domestic law unless 
there is a specific domestic law norm making them apply.12 Kong 
Xiangjun of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme People’s Court13 
and Cao Shouye, also a judge in the Supreme People’s Court,14 voice 
similar views. Finally, the President of the Supreme People’s Court 
recently declared: 
In the course of adjudication, People’s Courts must be 
knowledgeable about both domestic law and WTO rules; they must 
both grasp the technique of application of international treaty 
through transformation into domestic law, and do a good job in 
making judicial interpretations in accordance with the provisions of 
domestic law; they must both ensure the correct implementation of 
 
 
 11. A good statement in English of the position against unmediated incorporation is Zhaojie Li, 
The Effect of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the People’s Republic of China: Practice and Problems, 
4 ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 185 (1994). 
 12. Jiang Guoqing, Guoji Fa yu Guoji Tiaoyue de Jige Wenti [Some Issues of International Law 
and International Treaties], QUANGUO RENDA CHANGWEIHUI FAZHI JIANGZUO JIANGGAO ZHI SHISI 
[NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE LECTURES ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM, NO. 14] 
July 4, 2001, at http://www.npcnews.com.cn (website administered by the Office of the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee, News Bureau, Information Center). 
 13. See Kong Xiangjun, Tongyi Jieshi Yuanze yu WTO Falü de Sifa Shiyong [The Doctrine of 
Consistent Interpretation and the Use in Adjudication of WTO Law], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM 
DAILY], Oct. 14, 2001, at 3; Kong Xiangjun, WTO Falü de Guonei Shiyong [The Domestic Application 
of WTO Law], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 16, 2001, at 1; Kong Xiangjun, supra note 
1, at 3. 
 14. See Cao Shouye & Wang Fei, Zhongguo Fayuan Shiyong WTO Guize [The Application of 
WTO Rules by Chinese Courts], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY], Oct. 15, 2001, at 
http://www.rmfyb.com/public/detail.php?id=29271; Cao Shouye, Zhongguo Ru Shi Dui Renmin 
Fayuan de Yingxiang [The Effect Upon People’s Courts of China’s Entry Into the WTO], RENMIN 
FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY], Oct. 15, 2001, at http://www.rmfyb.com. 











international treaties in China, and pay attention to upholding state 
judicial sovereignty and the dignity of law.15 
While this statement is not as resolutely unambiguous as one might 
wish, it seems, with its constant references to domestic law and state 
sovereignty, to put the Supreme People’s Court in the camp of the anti-
unmediated incorporation school. Certainly this is consistent with what we 
already know about the operation of Chinese courts. Chinese courts tend 
to follow a hierarchy of rules that is the opposite of the putative hierarchy 
set forth in the constitution. While National People’s Congress legislation 
should take priority over conflicting State Council regulations, for 
example, in reality it is usually the other way around.16 It is hard, 
therefore, to imagine that Chinese courts, which would uphold a State 
Council rule against a contrary, but theoretically higher, National People’s 
Congress statute, and a National People’s Congress statute against a 
contrary, but theoretically higher, provision in the constitution, would 
override a very clear provision in an authoritative Chinese regulation in 
favor of a claim based solely on a right allegedly granted in one of the 
WTO agreements. 
The practical import of this discussion is twofold. First, the fact that 
such an important issue—whether or not courts can or should directly 
apply the provisions of China’s treaty obligations without further domestic 
legal authority—could go unresolved for so long shows the limited role 
traditionally played by courts and the legal system in the Chinese polity. 
This question has not been answered because it has never been a very 
important question. Second, assuming that the dominant official view is 
the one that will actually be adopted by courts and government 
institutions, this need not be a source of great alarm to foreign 
governments and traders. It is no different from the position taken by the 
United States with respect to its own WTO obligations.17 In any case, the 
 
 
 15. Xu Lai, Xiao Yang Zai Renmin Fayuan “Ru Shi” Hou Shenpan Gongzuo Zuotanhui Shang 
Tichu Zhuanbian Sifa Guannian Tigong Sifa Baozhang [Xiao Yang Suggests Transforming Judicial 
Concepts and Providing Judicial Protections at Roundtable Discussion on People’s Court 
Adjudication Work After Accession to the WTO], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Nov. 21, 
2001, at 1 (quoting Supreme People’s Court President Xiao Yang). 
 16. See Donald C. Clarke, State Council Notice Nullifies Statutory Rights of Creditors, E. ASIAN 
EXECUTIVE REP., Apr. 15, 1997, at 9. 
 17. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the domestic legislation pursuant to which the 
United States entered the WTO, provides that in case of conflict, U.S. federal law prevails over a WTO 
agreement and that WTO agreements prevail over state law, but only in actions brought by the U.S. 
government. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102, 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2002). 











number of private lawsuits before Chinese courts potentially implicating 
private rights granted under the WTO agreements is likely to be small.18 
CHINA’S ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH WTO COMMITMENTS AND 
PROCEDURES 
In assessing China’s ability to fulfill its commitments respecting its 
legal system and to comply with WTO procedures in such matters as the 
Transitional Review Mechanism and dispute resolution, we need both to 
look forward and to look back. Looking back, one cannot fail to be 
impressed with the amount of work that has been done by the government 
so far in identifying and revising—or abolishing where necessary—laws 
and regulations inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations.19 This work 
began, of course, long before China’s formal accession in November 2001. 
The scope of the effort can be appreciated by seeing what the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) is reported to have 
achieved by the end of 2000 in anticipation of WTO membership: the 
review of over 1400 laws, regulations, and similar documents, including 
six statutes (of which five were revised), 164 State Council regulations (of 
which 114 were to be repealed and 25 amended), 887 of its own ministry 
regulations (of which 459 were to be repealed and 95 amended), 191 
bilateral trade agreements, 72 bilateral investment treaties, and 93 tax 
treaties.20 In the first two months of 2001, the various ministries and 
commissions of the State Council reportedly reviewed some 2300 laws 
and regulations, of which 830 were identified as in need of repeal and 325 
as in need of revision.21 
Needless to say, the process of trying to identify inconsistent 
regulations in the abstract is bound to miss many problem areas. 
Identifying inconsistency is sometimes easy, but at other times takes a 
 
 
 18. The main areas where rights under WTO agreements might be directly asserted are (1) 
administrative litigation against Chinese government departments for (for example) failure to grant 
permits on a most-favored-nation basis, to reduce tariffs, or to take other actions promised in China’s 
accession protocol, and (2) proceedings to enforce intellectual property rights, in which the substantive 
and especially the procedural protections of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) could be attractive to plaintiffs. 
 19. This Article is not the place to canvass in detail what China has already accomplished in 
terms of WTO implementation. The United States-China Business Council has compiled useful 
summaries that can be found at U.S.-China Business Council, Towards WTO: Highlights of PRC 
Implementation Efforts to Date (June 2001), at http://www.uschina.org/prcwtocompliance.pdf and 
Toward WTO: Highlights of PRC Implementation Efforts to Date, September 2001, CHINA BUS. REV., 
Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 14. 
 20. See Nan Xianghong, supra note 2. 
 21. See id. 











high level of expertise and a full hearing by a dispute settlement panel in 
the context of a particular set of facts. Thus, we should not be surprised if 
many inconsistencies remain despite the government’s efforts. 
Nevertheless, the government has so far shown a great deal of energy in 
addressing problems of legislative inconsistency. 
A great deal of activity has also occurred outside of the field of 
legislative revision. In a relatively short period of time both before and 
after China’s accession to the WTO, the government promulgated a flood 
of new regulations designed to implement China’s commitments. Chinese 
officials have participated in countless training sessions, many with 
foreign financial support.22 The government has begun restructuring to 
facilitate the satisfaction of WTO requirements. For example, MOFTEC 
has established a Department of WTO Affairs to handle implementation 
and litigation, and a China WTO Notification and Enquiry Center in order 
to help implement its transparency commitments.23 MOFTEC has also 
established a Fair Trade Bureau for Import and Export to handle issues 
relating to unfair trade practices. The courts, for their part, have also 
undertaken training and other activities, such as review for WTO-
compatibility of existing Supreme People’s Court interpretations and other 
directives, designed to meet the requirements of WTO accession.24 
While much work remains to be done, there can be little doubt of the 
energy and commitment shown so far by the Chinese government. And 
this is to say nothing of the enthusiasm for knowledge about the WTO 
displayed outside of government. Almost any lecture or presentation 
mentioning the WTO is guaranteed to draw a large audience, and indeed 
among urban Chinese the English abbreviation is probably as common as, 




 22. Brian L. Goldstein, Stephen J. Anderson, and Jeremie Waterman provide a partial, but 
nevertheless very long, list of such programs. See Brian L. Goldstein et al., Foreign Contributions to 
China’s WTO Capacity Building, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 8, 10–11. 
 23. See Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Guanyu Zhongguo Zhengfu WTO 
Zixun Dian Zixun Banfa (Zanxing) [Measures Regarding the Making of Inquiries at the Government of 
China’s WTO Inquiry Point (Temporary)] (issued Jan. 1, 2002, effective Jan. 14, 2002) (providing the 
inquiry point with the official English name of “China WTO Notification and Enquiry Center”). A 
report dated April 11, 2002 stated that as of that time the Center had received over 300 inquiries. See 
XINHUA WANG [NEW CHINA NET], Jiangqiu Chengxin! Woguo Qieshi Lüxing Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi de 
Gexiang Chengnuo [Stress Sincerity! China Conscientiously Implements Each Commitment Made 
Upon WTO Entry] (Apr. 11, 2002), at http://www.exin.net/economic/itemview1.jsp?id=334638 (last 
visited June 3, 2002). 
 24. See To WTO Accession, Chinese Courts Think Ahead, CHINA L., Feb. 2002, at 58 
(interviewing Supreme People’s Court official Li Guoguang for a general account of activities within 
the court system) [hereinafter Li Interview]. 











Looking forward, there is reason to be generally sanguine about the 
prospect of China’s compliance with its commitments and its willingness 
and ability to modify its rules if it loses a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding. But there will be disappointments, and it is necessary to 
understand and anticipate them in order to put them in proper perspective 
and distinguish real and pressing problems from temporary and minor 
ones. 
As noted earlier, China undertook in the Working Party Report to meet 
its WTO commitments “through revising its existing laws and enacting 
new ones fully in compliance with the WTO Agreement.”25 The extent to 
which China revises its existing laws and promulgates new ones is 
something that can be monitored with relative ease. But clearly it is not 
enough simply to promulgate new regulations. They must be applied and 
enforced. Here, there are at least two major issues worthy of discussion. 
The first is the extent to which local governments will engage in WTO-
inconsistent practices that the central government is unable or unwilling to 
stop. One issue is clear: there is no question that, as a legal matter under 
China’s constitutional system, local governments must follow directives 
from the central government. Because the central government has the legal 
capacity to require local governments to conform to WTO obligations, it 
has the obligation to do so. 
Some members of the WTO Working Party on China’s accession were 
reported to have expressed concern that subnational governments in China 
might take measures inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations, and that 
the central government would not or could not remove such measures. 
China’s representative assured them that local governments had no 
autonomous authority over trade-related matters,26 and that the central 
government would “ensure” (not merely take the “reasonable measures” 
called for by Article XXIV:12 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) 1994) that local government regulations conformed to 
China’s WTO obligations. This assurance is one of China’s formal 
commitments. Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994, which presupposes a 




 25. See Working Party Report, supra note 6. 
 26. See id. ¶ 70. 
 27. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Canada—Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, L/5863 
(Sept. 17, 1985) (unadopted report), available at 1985 WL 291500 (finding that Article XXIV:12 
applies to federal, not unitary, states, and “only to those measures taken at the regional or local level 
which the federal government cannot control because they fall outside its jurisdiction under the 
constitutional distribution of competence[.]”). A subsequent panel report that was adopted used 











Obviously, however, the real question is not quite so simple as the legal 
question. Subnational governments in China can enjoy considerable de 
facto autonomy from Beijing; this is a fact, not simply a convenient excuse 
for inaction cooked up by the Chinese central government. China suffers 
from numerous internal trade barriers that the central government is 
continually struggling, often unsuccessfully, to remove. We should not be 
surprised if, even with good intentions, it has at least as much difficulty 
removing barriers to foreign goods and services. 
The phenomenon of local protectionism is one that has attracted the 
attention and concern of academics and policymakers in China for some 
time. Internal trade barriers are just one aspect of it; favoritism to local 
parties in courts is another. But it is important to understand that it is not 
just foreigners who want to get rid of local protectionism. It is generally in 
the interest of the central government to expand its sphere of actual 
authority and to reduce such local protectionism. Practical considerations, 
more than ideological ones, have stood in the way of progress in this area. 
Academics and others have proposed for years, for example, that judges in 
local courts should be appointed and salaried by the central government 
instead of the local government. So far, however, the central government 
has not been willing to expend the political and financial resources 
necessary to put this reform into practice. But pressure for such reform is 
building. A recent article in Jingji Yaocan (Economic Reference), the 
internal (non-public) journal of the State Council’s think tank on 
development issues, advocated precisely such a reform.28 
The main factor behind local economic protectionism is the 
dependence of local government upon local enterprises for revenues. To 
the extent a government collects revenues, whether in the form of taxes or 
profits from an enterprise, it is similar to an owner and has an interest in 
protecting those revenues. When the owner of an enterprise can control the 
conditions under which that enterprise competes, the results are utterly 
predictable. With the further progress of economic reform in China, one 
might expect to see a widening of the tax base along with a reduction in 
the dependence of local governments upon specific enterprises for 
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revenues. Needless to say, however, the influence of powerful local 
businesses seeking protection will not disappear in China any more than it 
has disappeared in China’s trading partners. 
The second issue is that of the capacity of China’s courts to handle a 
substantial workload of reasonably complex cases. Here the news is 
neither especially good nor especially news, since it has been widely 
known for some time that China’s courts are weak and its judges, on the 
whole, poorly qualified. China’s courts will continue to present difficulties 
in the years ahead.29 On the other hand, as in many other areas of Chinese 
legal and political life, reform is most likely where there is a solid 
domestic constituency for it, and court reform is undoubtedly one of those 
areas. The key issues in court reform, from the standpoint of China’s 
fellow WTO members, are the qualifications of judges, the willingness 
and capacity of courts to render fair judgments free of corruption and 
pressure from local government, and the ability of courts to execute those 
judgments once rendered. 
The low qualifications of China’s judges are no secret and indeed are a 
regular subject of discussion by high government officials, including the 
President of the Supreme People’s Court.30 As of 1995, for example, only 
five percent of China’s judges nationwide had a four-year college degree 
in any subject (let alone in law)31 and it is currently estimated that about 
ten percent of judges have a four-year college degree in law.32 A 1998 
study of nine basic-level courts (the lowest level) in a major provincial 
city revealed that only three percent of the judges had a bachelor’s degree 
in law.33 The “great majority” had held other types of jobs in the court 
administration such as bailiff, clerk, or driver before being promoted to the 
rank of judge.34 
The frequency with which situations such as this are reported suggests 
strongly that there is no political difficulty with advocating reform and that 
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such advocacy is supported in important sectors of the central government. 
China has in fact recently taken solid steps toward improving the 
qualifications of judges. In March of 2002, for example, China held the 
first administration of a new unified judicial examination for lawyers, 
prosecutors, and judges. Although sitting judges will not be required to 
take or pass the examination, to require this of judges going forward is 
already a surprisingly far-reaching reform at this stage of China’s legal 
development. Indeed, one wonders whether the pool of those who pass and 
are willing to serve as judges will be big enough to serve the needs of the 
court system. In any case, however, this reform—and the political 
difficulties that must have been overcome to effect it—is solid evidence of 
the potential for significant reform to occur where there is a domestic 
constituency for it. Fortunately, there is a domestic constituency for 
significant further reforms in the judicial system. 
In addition to the problem of the quality of judges, China’s courts are at 
present not fully reliable as enforcers of statutorily guaranteed rights. This 
is true for a number of reasons. First, while statutes are superior to 
regulations issued by government ministries in China’s formal 
constitutional structure, both government officials and court officials will 
generally consider a ministry regulation that is directly on point to be the 
applicable rule. This is simply a matter of what might be called customary 
legal culture; it has been both noted and criticized in China as well as 
abroad35 and many critics viewed WTO accession as a helpful spur to 
change. Nevertheless, change will not come quickly. Second, there is the 
well known problem of corruption in the judiciary. This problem is not of 
course unique to China. Third, Chinese courts often have difficulty 
enforcing their judgments.36  
Fourth, and less well known, is the tendency of Chinese courts not to 
aggressively seek jurisdiction over cases, but on the contrary to fear it and 
often to go to great lengths to avoid taking difficult or sensitive cases. 
Courts in China have the choice of accepting or declining a case. This 
power is somewhat akin to the institution of summary judgment in its 
gatekeeping function, but quite unlike it in that it is not governed by any 
consistent set of principles other than the court’s general sense of whether 
the case seems meritorious and deserving of further proceedings. Courts 
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can use this power simply to decline to hear, and thus avoid ruling on the 
merits of, cases that look troublesome and likely to offend powerful 
interests no matter how the court decides. 
Most recently, the Supreme People’s Court of China stirred up a major 
controversy when it instructed lower courts simply to stop accepting 
shareholder suits for damages based on certain violations of China’s 
Securities Law.37 This instruction, it is important to note, was not based 
upon a theory that the shareholders had no legal right of action under the 
Securities Law. It was explicitly based on the grounds that adequate 
procedures had not yet been worked out for hearing such suits, and that 
they would therefore have to wait.38 The real reason was simply that the 
courts were terrified of a number of lawsuits that shareholders were 
bringing, or about to bring, in several courts around the country. The 
specter of overloaded judicial resources and inconsistent decisions on 
similar facts was too much to contemplate. 
Several months later, the Supreme People’s Court finally announced 
that investors would be allowed to proceed with actions based on claims of 
false disclosures in securities trading, but only where China’s Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) had established the existence of such 
false disclosures.39 While this is no doubt welcome news to investors, it 
underscores the casual attitude taken by government agencies and courts 
toward statutorily granted rights. The Court apparently agrees with the 
plaintiffs that they have a valid claim under the Securities Law, but has 
interposed, without any statutory foundation whatsoever, the CSRC as a 
gatekeeper in order to ensure that claims not approved by the government 
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will not come before the courts. All other claims remain barred for at least 
the time being. 
WHAT KIND OF LEGAL SYSTEM DOES THE WTO REQUIRE? 
Despite the problems discussed above, it must be recalled that the 
WTO does not mandate a perfect legal system, or even a basically fair one, 
outside of a few specific areas. At times, according to some of the more 
ambitious claims, it seems that China must utterly revamp its legal and 
political system—in short, stop being China—or risk being found in 
violation of its WTO commitments. One analyst goes so far as to state that 
the national treatment and transparency requirements of the GATT require 
China to amend its constitution to eliminate any special position for the 
Communist Party and to delete or amend the word “socialism” to the 
extent that it implies or authorizes Party control over the operation of the 
legal system.40 
This is going too far. First, the requirements of the WTO agreements 
for fairness and transparency are in fact surprisingly limited. The only 
WTO agreement that comes close to a general requirement of fairness in 
the operation of the legal system is the TRIPS Agreement. This agreement 
does indeed set forth a number of requirements for fair judicial 
proceedings for the protection of intellectual property rights.41 However, it 
is worth noting that Article 41.5 specifically states: 
this Part [III] does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial 
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct 
from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect 
the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in 
the Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of 
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
the enforcement of law in general.42 
Once this disclaimer of obligation is taken into account, there is not 
much left of the Part III obligations beyond the duty to pass appropriate 
legislation. It is hard to see a strong mandate here for institutional reforms. 
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Finally, of course, the TRIPS Agreement’s obligations apply only to 
proceedings for the protection of intellectual property rights. These are a 
small part of the legal system’s activity. Indeed, the very fact that the 
requirements of Part III are specifically listed in the TRIPS Agreement 
suggests that those requirements do not apply to the other WTO 
agreements and do not attach to WTO membership generally; they could 
almost be read as a list of features a country’s judicial system does not 
need to have outside the realm of intellectual property. 
Other WTO agreements such at the GATT and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) also have provisions spelling out 
transparency requirements, but once again the obligation is more limited 
than generally assumed. Article X of the GATT contains requirements 
respecting transparency and the impartial administration of law, but these 
apply only to a limited subset of China’s laws: those affecting trade in 
goods. Similarly, the corresponding provision of the GATS applies only to 
scheduled sectors—those that China has agreed to open up at least 
partially. 
In short, there is no general obligation under the WTO agreements to 
have a fair and well functioning legal system. That obligation applies only 
to specific actions in specific sectors. Of course, it is unlikely that a state 
could produce a fair and well functioning legal system in those sectors and 
be unable or unwilling to produce it in others. Nevertheless, it is important 
to bear in mind that the undoubted problems of China’s legal system 
cannot uniformly be condemned as violations of its WTO commitments. 
Many WTO members have or used to have legal systems of questionable 
fairness, yet nobody has ever suggested they were therefore disqualified 
from WTO membership. The fact that China happens to be a major actor 
in the world trading system, whereas these members may not have been, 
does not change the argument. 
A second answer to the claims that accession requires major revisions 
to China’s entire legal system is to note that the WTO system cares much 
less about what you say than about what you do. The constitutions of the 
WTO member states contain any number of vague provisions susceptible 
of various interpretations, many of which might be WTO-unfriendly. But 
the issue for China’s trading partners is not whether its constitution gives 
primacy to the Communist Party in judicial proceedings. It is not even 
whether the Communist Party in practice controls judicial proceedings. It 
is whether those proceedings, as actually conducted, meet the GATT, 
GATS, and TRIPS Agreement tests of fairness and transparency. 
The area of the Chinese legal system that will probably cause the most 
difficulty is its present inability to provide, at least on a consistent basis, 











truly independent review of administrative actions. The financial 
dependence of courts on local government is compounded first by the 
lower political status of judges relative to many of the officials whose 
actions they will be called upon to judge, and second simply by the 
tradition of judicial deference to administration. This tradition is 
reinforced in a very concrete way by the structure of courts, which are at 
every level part of the so-called “political-legal” system at the same level 
of the administrative hierarchy. This system is a vehicle of Party control 
that coordinates the activities of courts, police, and prosecutors. Parties 
may be justly dubious of receiving an impartial hearing in an environment 
where ex parte contacts are common, corruption is widespread, and courts 
are allowed and even encouraged to contact superior courts (without notice 
to the parties) for their advice on specific cases before rendering a 
judgment. 
Future reform is not, of course, out of the question. Many of the 
problems were diagnosed in China long ago and the solutions to at least 
some of them are already on the table: among them, for example, putting 
power over staffing and financing of courts to the central government, 
raising judicial salaries in order to attract better-trained personnel, and 
ending the use of courts as a dumping ground for demobilized army 
officers. 
Bearing in mind the problems outlined above, I shall now turn to a few 
specific commitments relating to China’s legal system where I see 
potential difficulties in compliance. Three relate to transparency. In 
Paragraph 334 of the Working Party Report, China promised to make 
available, not less than ninety days following implementation, all laws, 
regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods or 
services, TRIPS, or foreign exchange control in one or more of the official 
WTO languages. Considering the vast array of potential sources of 
relevant measures, including central ministries, local governments, and 
people’s congresses, and even the court system, this is an astonishingly 
ambitious commitment. It is worth noting that despite the great thirst in the 
private sector for such translations, not a single service, commercial or 
otherwise, exists today that can truly say that it provides translations of all 
such laws and regulations. The universe is simply too vast. 
China has undertaken a similarly vast commitment in Paragraph 336 of 
the Working Party Report. It has promised to designate one or more 
enquiry points where information about all laws, regulations, and other 
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods or services, TRIPS, or 











foreign exchange control, as well as texts, can be obtained.43 To fulfill this 
promise completely, the enquiry point will have to be fully informed as to 
all relevant provincial and local regulations from all parts of China. One 
wonders whether any country could carry this out successfully. 
Finally, in Paragraph I.2.C.3 of the Accession Protocol, China has 
promised that any individual, enterprise, or WTO member can request 
information about any measure required to be published under the 
Accession Protocol at a designated enquiry point, and that a response will 
be forthcoming within thirty or at most forty-five days. Although China 
has promised an “authoritative” reply only to fellow WTO members, it has 
nevertheless promised an “accurate and reliable” reply to individuals and 
enterprises. Even this standard could prove difficult to meet if the enquiry 
point is flooded with questions. In short, these three provisions all seem to 
promise to make available a kind of knowledge that does not currently 
exist, and which it will be very burdensome to provide. 
Similar problems are likely to afflict the Transitional Review 
Mechanism, which on China’s part consists primarily of the obligation to 
supply information. Given the vast range of information called for, it 
seems inevitable that China will interpret the requirements for information 
disclosure narrowly. While procuring the statistical information called for 
is merely a question of requiring the relevant authorities to collect the data, 
it will be more difficult to provide the promised complete lists of relevant 
regulations and administrative measures. It will not always be obvious that 
a particular regulation may have an impact on trade in goods or services. 
In addition to the specific problems indicated above, the Working Party 
Report and the Accession Protocol also pose somewhat contradictory 
demands both at the conceptual level and at the concrete level. They 
generally promote the strengthening of legal institutions in China, but in 
some places seem to promote the opposite and instead to encourage China 
to continue its tradition of administrative omnipotence. More generally, 
China’s government is paradoxically being asked to exercise central power 
to further decentralization, and to exercise administrative power to 
strengthen judicial power. 
Consider, for example, Paragraph 68 of the Working Party Report, 
where China promised to implement its commitments through the timely 
promulgation of administrative regulations, departmental rules, and other 
central government measures. If they were not promulgated in time, the 
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government would still honor China’s WTO commitments. Presumably 
China made this promise at the behest of Working Party members, but it is 
tantamount to saying that the government may decide at any time simply 
to ignore its own duly promulgated regulations and to operate according to 
some other set of standards. Fortunately for the rule of law in China, the 
Chinese government was apparently not asked to promise to ignore 
“laws,” i.e., legal requirements issued by a constitutionally superior body, 
the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee. 
Perhaps more troublesome is the fact that apparently courts, as well as 
administrative agencies, are to ignore state regulations if they cannot be 
changed in time. Here, the issue is how courts are to be informed, other 
than through the normal process of formal repeal and replacement, that 
duly promulgated State Council regulations they would normally be bound 
to implement have lost their effectiveness. The only method would seem 
to be one that China’s trading partners are in other arenas encouraging her 
to move away from: the unofficial note or telephone call from a senior 
official instructing courts to operate in a way that is both arbitrary and 
opaque. 
Similarly, Paragraph 203 of the Working Party Report contains a 
promise not to enforce the terms of contracts containing foreign exchange 
balancing, local content, or export requirements. The demise of such 
obligations will cause few tears among foreign investors. If the 
government is saying that as a regulator, it will decline to exercise its 
discretionary authority to seek sanctions against those who do not fulfill 
those terms of their joint venture contracts, that is one thing. But if it is 
claiming the power to order courts not to enforce, between parties, 
contract rights arising under laws passed by the National People’s 
Congress or its Standing Committee (both constitutionally superior 
bodies), that is quite another. It may indeed have such power as a matter of 
practical fact, but whether China’s trading partners should be encouraging 
its exercise is questionable. 
PROSPECTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLIANCE AND CAPACITY-BUILDING 
Because of China’s relative lack of experience with a market economy, 
it is inevitable that despite the government’s efforts to identify and weed 
out WTO-inconsistent legislation, some inconsistent rules and practices 
will remain, and new ones will crop up. It is in fact likely that many such 
inconsistent rules will be discovered over time. The government has 
already devoted considerable energy to making Chinese laws and 
regulations consistent with its WTO obligations. As in any country, there 











may be rules the government wishes to retain that its trading partners view 
as questionable under WTO principles, such as the E.U. rules on bananas 
or the U.S. rules on Foreign Sales Corporations. There may also be rules 
that displease China’s trading partners that do not in fact run afoul of the 
WTO agreements. But there is no reason to doubt that the Chinese 
government is in principle genuinely committed to getting rid of many of 
the old rules that shackled the economy and has seized WTO accession as 
an opportune moment to do it. There is no reason to think that the Chinese 
government is committed to defending every WTO-inconsistent rule to the 
bitter end. 
The United States is now very much involved, both at the 
governmental and the non-governmental level, in activities aimed at 
promoting compliance and building capacity.44 These activities should 
continue. Considering the volume of trade at stake, the required 
expenditure is probably quite modest. 
The United States should work with China to develop formal 
mechanisms—some of which are already in existence—that can identify 
questionable rules and practices, hear arguments from affected parties, and 
deliver advice to the appropriate governmental body on the WTO-
consistency of the rule. Such mechanisms would give the Chinese 
government the opportunity to continue, in a structured and unified way, 
its review of its own regulations, and could serve to obviate the need for 
formal WTO dispute resolution procedures in many cases. 
In particular, compliance and capacity-building efforts should be 
directed at local governments. The degree of local government 
commitment to reform and receptivity to WTO standards and principles 
varies. But almost all local governments have one thing in common: they 
are drastically less informed than the central government about the WTO 
in general and about China’s specific commitments in particular. Only 
recently have the WTO accession documents been available in Chinese. 
Even though they can now be downloaded from MOFTEC’s website,45 it 
is no more realistic to expect Chinese local officials to understand their 
details than to expect American local officials to understand the WTO. 
There is a great need at the local level for seminars and workshops that 
will explain the basic principles of non-discrimination and transparency. 
Local governments should be encouraged to set up their own offices for 
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hearing and resolving complaints about WTO-inconsistent measures so 
that recourse need not be had to Beijing or, failing that, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.  
It is important, however, to pay some attention to the target audience. It 
may make a great deal of sense to train judicial officials in the principles 
of transparency and due process, for example, but they have very little 
need to be acquainted with China’s substantive commitments under the 
WTO. Those commitments mean little to courts until they have been 
translated into domestic law. On the other hand, it is probably a good idea 
to train local government officials in the principles of non-discrimination 
and national treatment, since the granting of special breaks and favors on 
an ad hoc basis is a deeply rooted government practice as natural and 
unremarkable as breathing.46 
CONCLUSION 
China is a large country in which the central government has a serious 
problem in making its writ run in a number of sectors. Moreover, it is just 
emerging from a period of extensive, and perhaps WTO-inconsistent, 
government control over economic activity. Even assuming the utmost 
good faith on the part of the central government, therefore, there are bound 
to be WTO-inconsistent measures and practices—quite possibly a good 
number of them—that persist after China’s accession. Those who predict 
problems are not wrong to point this out. What is unlikely, however, is 
that these problems will amount to more than routine frictions, and will 
bring either China or the world trading system crashing down, or will 
require major changes in the way China is governed, such as removal of 
the Communist Party from its traditional spheres of influence. 
First of all, any dispute settlement proceedings that are undertaken will 
take time. This is insufficiently realized by many Chinese commentators, 
who are afflicted perhaps by too strong a sense of urgency. It is commonly 
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said, for example, that the need to identify and revise inconsistent 
regulations is pressing because if inconsistencies are found once China is 
in the WTO, its trading partners can impose trade sanctions. In fact, of 
course, the process is not nearly so fast. The complaining state must first 
notify China of its complaint and then engage in discussions. Only when 
the complaining state declares dissatisfaction with the results may it bring 
a proceeding under the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures. If China 
ultimately loses the dispute, the Dispute Settlement Understanding allows 
a reasonable time—generally about fifteen months—within which to 
modify the offending regulations. 
Second, it has become clear even in the very short time since China’s 
accession that its trading partners have no intention of flooding the 
Dispute Settlement Body with complaints. Individual companies cannot 
bring complaints in this forum against WTO members; only other member 
governments may do so. The trade authorities of those member 
governments have limited resources and must pick and choose the cases 
they want to bring. Moreover, they are limited by diplomatic 
considerations. Thus, there is no evidence of a rush on anyone’s part to 
bring large numbers of complaints.47 
In considering the usefulness of compliance and capacity-building 
programs, it is important to bear in mind that the main driver of change in 
the Chinese legal system will be internal developments in China, not 
foreign legal assistance programs. Thus, effective compliance and 
capacity-building programs must be designed to work over the long term 
and to build relationships with specific institutions. They must strike the 
balance between asking too much and asking too little, either of which will 
lead to nothing being done. And the U.S. government must be willing to 
work with and through non-governmental organizations, other WTO 
members, and multilateral organizations in order first to demonstrate that 
WTO compliance is not simply a narrow American political interest, and 
second to avoid having discussions about Chinese compliance with 
multilateral standards turn into possibly contentious, and certainly 
fruitless, discussions about U.S. trade practices vis-à-vis China. 
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